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Leverette: The Carolina Law Journal of 1830

THE CAROLINA LAW JOURNAL OF 1830
SARAH LEVERETTE*

Today the "blue-back" of the South CarolinaLaw Quarterly
is a familiar sight in the libraries of the Bar of this state.
Its regular appearance along with occasional special issues
has added greatly to the rather sparse collection of local materials available to the South Carolina lawyer.
Less familiar to the contemporary bar, however, is a very
interesting but short-lived publication of the 1830's, the Carolina Law Journal. The circumstances surrounding its birth
and the reason for its early demise are not easily determined.
Inquiries on the local level as well as through the Library of
Congress have revealed very little. One reference was located
in the sesquicentennial publication, Columbia, Capital City of
South Carolina,1786-1936, ed. by Helen Kohn Hennig, R. L.
Bryan Company, 1936, p. 167:
What is believed to be the only law journal ever published in this state, and certainly one of the earliest to appear in the entire country, was edited by Abram Blanding and D. J. McCord. The Journal was not a financial
success, and ran for only one year, 1831.
Perhaps, this brief review will serve to accomplish two purposes - to bring to light an additional bit of the legal lore of
our state and, perhaps, to find an historian who can add to
our meager knowledge concerning this publication.
The CarolinaLaw Journal edited by A. Blanding and D. J.
McCord and printed by "The Times and Gazette" office of
Columbia was published in four issues dating from 1830 to
1831. The last page of the last issue carries the following
note:
Note. - This number completes the first volume of the
Law Journal. For reasons, which it is unnecessary to
state, the work will be discontinued.
Those who have not contributed the amount of their
subscription will see the propriety of remitting the same
immediately, that the business relating to the Law Journal may be brought to a close as early as possible.
*A.B., University of South Carolina; LL.B., University of South
Carolina, School of Law; Law IAbrarian, University of South Carolina,
School of Law.
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Though the Journal carries no table of contents, the very
brief index reveals an infinite variety of legal information,
from a digest of the Acts of Assembly from 1813 to 1830, to
an unsigned article on the subject of "Denization."
In this day of controversy over the jury system in America
it is interesting to note that 129 years ago the first issue of
the Journal carried an article on the rights and powers of
juries, a discussion from the Westminster Review, the object
of which "is to prove that Juries have, and always had, and
of right ought to have, the power of deciding, incidentally,
questions of law [in all criminal cases, or cases involving constitutional questions] - or in other words, to determine the
whole issue submitted to them, by pronouncing the general
verdict, and that that power imposes upon them the obligation
of so doing." Quoting further from the Westminster article:
...Our answer is, that we consider the right of Juries to
give a general verdict, and to decide upon the whole question of the guilt or innocence of those who are tried before them, to be absolutely essential, not merely to the
liberty of the press, but to the general existence of constitutional freedom in this country. If this right be wrested
from them, and transferred to the Judges, the protection of trial by Jury, in all cases of contest between the
crown and the subject, would, in our opinion, be destroyed; and though we undoubtedly think that better securities might be provided for the due administration of
justice than can be obtained from the Jury system, in any
shape, yet it is of the highest importance that the securities which such a system undoubtedly may and does offer
to that all-important end, should not be swept away by
by the arbitrary determination of our Judges, aided and
assisted by the misrepresentation of despotism-advocating scribes.
Such would indicate that the judge vs. jury question is not a
new one.
More incredible for its modern turn is the article reprinted
from the CharlestonMercury of October 20, 1823 referring to
and quoting the Columbia Telescope on the subject of "Coloured Marriages". The Telescope writer severely criticizes the
opinion of Judge Johnson (though no first name is given in
the article or the case, O'Neall's Bench and Bar confirms
identification of William Johnson, United States Supreme
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Court Justice) in the case of Ellison v. Deliesseline (Fed. Cas.
4,366, Circuit Court, District of South Carolina, August 1823)
in which a state law authorizing the seizure and imprisonment of free negroes brought into the state on board any
foreign vessel is held unconstitutional. He states:
. . [T] he Judge's opinions are greatly to be regretted.
Everybody knows that a suspicion, from political motives,
has been industriously propagated that the Supreme
Court of the United States has gradually been encroaching on state rights. A Judge of that Court should be particularly, anxiously cautious not to add weight to that
suspicion. Has Judge Johnson been so? Has he not given
force and currency to it?
Following these timely discussions are a subjoined opinion
and order of Chancellor William Harper in the case of Reynolds v. Scarboroughand Brewer on the question of dealings
between trustee and cestui que trust "because some of the
points are new, and all of them are questions of interest to the
community and the Profession." The subject of adverse possession is "very fully considered" in an argument of Chancellor Harper before his promotion to the Equity Bench in the
case of Willison and Watkins and in the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States in their "late decision of
the same case"'
In view of the omission of dates in the next case it must
be placed by circumstantial evidence. The editors referring to
it state:
As the case of Henderson v. Laurens has never been published except in a newspaper, and is one which the regular course of reporting will not embrace, it is thought
proper to give it a more permanent form, by inserting it
in this journal.
The case referred to sets out in detail the opinion of Chancellor DeSaussure on the subject of compound interest and
arose out of the same subject matter as the case of that name
reported in 2 DeSaussure 170 (1802) - opinion of Chancellor Rutledge. Both cases involved settlement of the estate of
Henry Laurens.
Though the instant case has no date nor is there certainty
as to the court from which it came, it seems from a review of
the equity court system of that time that it was heard by
Chancellor DeSaussure sitting as a single district equity
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judge. Apparently, reports of cases from these courts were not
published unless the case went up on appeal to the full bench
of judges in equity and often not even then.
This issue also contains a "tribute of respect to the memory
of Judge Nott (Court of Appeals) . . . on behalf of the Bar
of Columbia" made by Col. Blanding (most likely Col. Abram
Blanding, son-in-law of Chancellor DeSaussure and one of the
editors of this Journal). The tribute included a resolution on
the part of the members of the Bar to "wear the usual symbol of mourning for thirty days". Reply to this tribute was
made by Judge David Johnson of the Court.
The recent American Bar Association convention held in
England, the dedication of the memorial to Magna Carta, and
the return visit of the English Bar planned for 1960, all attest
to the awareness of the contemporary American Bar of the
great debt owed to that country for our heritage, the common
law. However, by comparison with the lawyer and the legal
system of the 1830's, the profession of today is somewhat
removed from this source by time and adaptation of the system to an American pattern. In the early 19th century, the
fact that the legal profession in this country was still closely
linked with the English as well as civil systems is indicated
by the interest exhibited in continental and English law and
lawyers.
The CarolinaLaw Journal, in its initial issue, carried a reprint of an article entitled "Sir Edward Coke" and "Published
under the Superintendence of the Society for the Diffusion
of Useful Knowledge" in London in 1828. Though this writing is to some extent a discourse upon the character and
works of Lord Coke, it is also concerned with legal education.
Here again a subject of much contemporary interest was discussed with keen perception 129 years ago - and oddly
enough the same conclusion is reached concerning pre-law
training that is being advocated today. Though couched in
the language and terminology of the day, the following statement seems to wholly espouse the cause of the "broad cultural base" as a prerequisite to legal education:
We do not believe that any branch of human knowledge,
requires in a higher degree a good preparatory education particularly in the classics, history, moral philosophy, logic, metaphysics, and a familiar acquaintance with
the language and thoughts of the best English writers
of poetry and prose.
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The second issue of the Journal opens with a biographical sketch of the "celebrated Chancellor D'Aguesseau". The
sketch reveals Henri Francois D'Aguesseau, not only as one of
the most learned and scholarly men of France in the late 17th
and early 18th centuries, but indicates his high rank as a reformer of French jurisprudence.
One or two cases appearing in the Journal have been previously noted, one of which was a so-called "unreported case"
(Henderson v. Laurens). Of the numerous other case reports
appearing throughout the volume, we will discuss only those
which are unreported (the reported ones may be found in the
South Carolina Reports of that period) and those which for
some other reason would be of interest.
Although the case of Williamson v. Farrow appears in the
reported cases, it is interesting to note that the Journal version of the facts is worded somewhat differently than that appearing in the reports. This case involved a question of computation of time as set out in a court order calling for resale
of property previously sold under mortgage foreclosure. Not
appearing in the reports, however, is the argument of Mr.
Blanding upon a point not covered by the Court in its opinion.
The somewhat lengthy argument is introduced by the editors
as follows:
The Court of Appeals having given no opinion on the second ground submitted by the defendants to sustain the
nonsuit; at the request of several members of the profession, we publish the argument of Mr. Blanding on that
point.
The case of Farnndisv. Henderson was cited only this year
in a student note written for publication in the South Carolina Law Quarterly. This case, reported only in the Carolina
Law Journal, involved the effect of religious opinions on the
competency of testimony. The opinion of Chancellor DeSaussure apparently sitting as a single district equity judge in
Union District was affirmed on appeal. The witness involved
held a belief in a Supreme Being, in Jesus Christ and in the
Holy Scriptures and varied from the norm only in that he believed that rewards and punishment for our deeds would take
place in this world and not the hereafter. Chancellor DeSaussure resolves the question of competency herein as follows:
...

The real question, however, is, whether the belief of

God and his Providence, and that he is the avenger of
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falsehood, though the vengeance is confined to punishment, in this world, does not give this tie, this hold on
the conscience which is sought for? In my judgment, it
does, so far at least as to impose on the Court an obligation to forbear its interference with the civil rights of
the man, which would be violated by excluding him from
being a witness.
A discourse upon the "Liability of Corporators" is contained in the circuit degree of Chancellor DeSaussure and the
appeal decree of Judge David Johnson (dissent by Colcock,
C. J.) in the case of Hume v. Winyaw & Wando Canal Co.
(not found in the table of reported cases). Under the heading of "Commandite, or Partnerships of Limited Responsibility" the editors propose the enactment of legislation providing for such partnerships prefacing the proposed bill with
these words in part:
It will be seen that according to the decision in Hume vs.
The Winyaw and Wando Canal Company, published in
this number, that corporations are wholly unsuited to
the prosecution of commercial business, and it is most
evident, that joint stock companies should never be chartered by the Legislature, except for the purpose of effecting some work of great public utility, which is too extensive for the enterprise of a single individual. Where
private interest alone is concerned and joint efforts
are necessary to effect the object, those efforts should
be directed under a personal responsibility, which will
afford security to all, who deal with them. The common
law has regarded that security, attainable only by having
the liability of the partnership funds, and the personal
and individual liability to all the partners. The extent of
this rule, we think, has been unfavorable to commerce,
and has prevented much capital from being vested in
trade. There are many persons, who have surplus funds,
which they would be willing to put into trade, with a prudent partner, but for the circumstance, that, however
small their interest in a copartnership may be, their whole
private fortunes are liable to satisfy the copartnership
debts in case of misfortune. A medium between the utter
responsibility claimed by corporators, and the unlimited
liability of copartners is certainly desirable, provided it
can be obtained without introducing fraud and ruinous
speculations; and in case those who credit such a concern
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can do it with security and with ordinary diligence, may
be able to ascertain the extent of the security they have
for the payment of their demands.-This, it is believed,
can be obtained by the establishment of copartnerships of
limited responsibility, or what the French call commandite.
Thus there seemed to be no hesitancy on the part of the
Bar of this period not only to criticize existing legislation or
lack of it but to submit proposed remedies for such situations.
This is further borne out by articles pointing out the imperfection of the Registry Acts, attacking the state of the law as
to a husband's liability for the debts of his wife and suggesting remedial legislative measures for both:
We believe that South Carolina is the only country,
among civilized nations, where at the present time, marriage is regarded as perfectly indissoluble ....
The endurance of partial suffering, from incompatibility
of tempers, or vicious habits, among married people, is
an evil vastly less, in our opinion, than that which arises
in other countries, from the facility with which divorces
are granted.
Thus, is reflected an attitude upon this subject which prevailed in South Carolina law until the 1949 amendment of
the State Constitution permitting divorce for the first time,
and this begins in the January 1831 issue of the Journal a
discussion of the effect of foreign divorces on South Carolina
marriage. So that long before the courts entertained either a
Haddock or a Williams on this point, it was being resolved in
South Carolina in the negative:
All these questions will be settled, when our Judges, following those of England, shall declare, that a marriage
solemnized in South Carolina,is indissoluble by the sentence of any earthly tribunal, foreign or domestic. And
we have every confidence, that when the question comes
before them such will be their judgment.
Compelled by these observations the editors include the Consistory Reports version of the case of Dalrymple v. Dalrymple
embodying the lengthy opinion of Sir William Scott upon the
subject of "The validity of a Scotch marriage,per verba de
praesenti,and without religious celebration: one of the parties
being an English gentleman, not otherwise resident in Scotland, than as quartered with his regiment in that country."
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Apparently not of the most constant turn of mind the English "gentleman" upon his return to England made a subsequent marriage. The court, however, seemed inclined to force
constancy upon the "gentleman" and the first marriage in
Scotland was held valid in England.
Attesting further to the professional interest of the time in
continental legal systems, the Journal in the issue of October
1830 published a rather scholarly article from the Foreign
Quarterly Review of January 1829 entitled "Meyer's Work on
the Spirit, Origin and Progress of the Judicial Institutions of
the Principal Countries of Europe" stating with reference to
the work:
It was written with a view to the state of things in England; and the reader will, therefore, find some views
which we would not consider perfectly orthodox on this
side of the Atlantic: yet, on the whole it contains so much
matter that is applicable to our own country, that we
have laid it before our readers; few of whom have an opportunity of consulting the original or the English view
of it.
The final issue of this publication carries an article the
preface to which would seem to indicate (as have certain
other comments) that the Journalwas not intended wholly for
professional consumption but was designed to enlighten the
"general reader" as well. The editorial introduction to the
republication of "Huberus, de Conflictu Legum" after commenting upon the increasing variety of legislative enactments
and judicial decisions among our several (24) states and the
resulting conflict of laws adds this statement - "The profession have access to the translation in 3 Dallas Rep. 370 but
the general reader has not the same advantage. The reporter
is only found on the shelf of the lawyer." To digest such esoteric fare it would seem that the interest and intellectual
level of the general reader of the 1830's was of a somewhat
higher quality than that of today.
The Carolina Law Journal ended publication on a contemporary note with a lengthy journalistic account of the "Trial
of the French Ministers". Unable to obtain a fully reliable account of this trial elsewhere "We have at last been compelled
to take it from Galignani'sMessenger. We are not certain that
we have the whole evidence, but what we have, is so interesting, and communicates so much information in relation to the
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late (July 1830) Revolution in France, that we are sure it
must be acceptably received by our readers." From other comments it is evident that the oratory of the French Bar as contained in this account was in part reason for its inclusion.
The Revolution referred to was the uprising in 1830 which
overthrew the Bourbon dynasty and restored the house of
Orleans to the throne of France. The trial was that of Prince
Polignac, churchman, royalist, confidant and representative
of Charles X (then deposed) and other ex-ministers before
the Court of Peers on December 15, 1830. Charged "with conspiring, through the means of the memorable ordinances of
July, to overthrow the charter and liberties of the French
people", each registered a protest against the competency of
the Court to question their acts by command of the King in
Council. Much of the detailed account of this trial is in the
question and answer form of a transcript closing with the
lengthy (52 pages) argument of M. de Martignac, counsel for
the defense on behalf of Polignac and final pronouncement of
the sentence: imprisonment for life. This account is highly
recommended for its interesting detail and for the usual attraction that contemporary relation of historic events holds
for every reader.
The review of this interesting journal proves that we are
inclined to bury much of value by relegating volumes of this
nature to a dusty grave. The literature of an era when thinking was a practised art and meditation was possible can fill a
great need at any period. It behooves us to disinter such works
at intervals that the product of deliberative thought and artistic expression be not lost.
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